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Abstract 
This paper compares the optimal tariff and revenue maximizing tariffs in the presence of partial privatization. We 
show that in an international mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs and partial privatization, when the marginal cost 
of the privatized firm exceeds a critical value, maximum -revenue tariff is higher than optimum-welfare tariff. 
Otherwise, optimum-welfare tariff is higher than maximum-revenue tariff. In addition, associating with the market-
opening policy, the domestic government should accelerate privatization path and impose a lower welfare-optimum 
tariff rate.
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The issue of maximum-revenue tariff versus optimum-welfare tariffs is interesting and
has gained attention, because the tariffs revenue is an important income source of the
government before building up an efficient tax system in a developing country. The
government in system transition process may adjust its goal from maximum-revenue to
optimum-welfare along with the economic improvement and the need of fiscal reform. The
aim of this paper is to compare the optimal tariff and revenue maximizing tariffs in the
presence of partial privatization.
In a traditional tariff analysis, Johnson (1951-1952) argued that the maximum-revenue
tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff because a   ‘ l a r g e ’   c o u n t r y   c o u l d   c h a n g e   t h e  
terms of trade in order to raise its social welfare level. Collie (1991) demonstrated that in a
quantity competition oligopoly market with a linear demand function and an asymmetric
marginal cost, the maximum-revenue tariff will be raised up if domestic marginal cost is
higher, and the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than the optimum-welfare tariff if
d o m e s t i c   f i r m ’ s   m a r g i n a l   c o s t   i s   r e l a t i v e ly higher than that of foreign firm. Clarke and Collie
(2006) found that in a Bertrand price competition model, the optimum-welfare tariff is higher
than the maximum-revenue tariff when the product is highly substitutable. Wang et al. (2009)
introduced market share delegation in a trade duopoly context, and demonstrated that the
home government unambiguously imposes a higher optimum-welfare tariff than
maximum-revenue regardless of the form of delegation. Wang et al. (2010) re-examined the
tariff ranking issue under a linear mixed oligopoly model with foreign competitors and
asymmetric costs.
1 In particular, they demonstrated that under Cournot competition, when
the sizes of domestic private and foreign private firms become more unequally distributed,
the optimum-welfare tariff will exceed the maximum-revenue tariff.
In this paper, we find that in an international mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs
and partial privatization, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm exceeds a critical
value, maximum-revenue tariff is higher than optimum-welfare tariff. Otherwise,
1 Maw (2002) reviewed the empirical evidence and justified adopting partial privatization in transitional
e c o n o m i e s .   C h a n g   ( 2 0 0 5 )   a d o p t e d   Ma t s u m u r a ’ s   ( 1998) model to analyze the optimal trade and privatization
policies in an international mixed duopoly with cost asymmetry, while Chao and Yu (2006) examined the
effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimal tariffs and found that foreign competition
lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. Van Long and Stähler (2009) recently
established a mixed duopoly model with partial privatization to discuss how state ownership impacts the
optimal import tariff and export subsidy. The above papers concern how the degree of partial privatization
affects optimal tariff but not the revenue-maximum tariff.2
optimum-welfare tariff is higher than maximum-revenue tariff.
This paper is organized as follows. Basic modeling is provided in Section 2. Section
3 contains the analysis of tariff ranking and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. Basic Model
Assuming that domestic demand function is Q a P   , there is one domestic public firm
and n foreign private firms engaging in Cournot competition. The supply equation is
given by    
n
i fi s q q Q
1 , where s q and fi q denote, respectively, domestic public
f i r m ’ s and foreign private firms’   p r o d u c t i o n s .     We   a l s o   a s s u m e   that cost functions are
s s s q c C  , and fi f fi C c q  for i from 1 to n, with 0   f s c c indicating that the
production efficiency of public firm is lower than that of identical foreign private firm
2.
We assume that government could levy tariff on imports and the magnitude of tariff is given
by t.
For the foreign firms to maximize profit, the optimization problem is:
  fi q
Max. fi fi fi fi tq C Pq     (1)
Following the assumption of literatures
3 and considering the target function of the
government is to maximize social welfare,
W     
n





CS  is the consumer surplus; s s s C Pq π     i s   p u b l i c   f i r m ’ s   profit. When
government privatizes the public firm partially, the optimization problem for the privatized
firm is:
  s q
Max. S               
n
i fi s s q CS W
1 1 1      (3)
where  is the weight on producer profits in the decision-making process of the firm, and
2 When f s c c  , no foreign private firm will be putted into production. Also see Huang, Lee and Chen
(2006) for the extended specification.
3 Public firm may h a v e   o t h e r   d i f f e r e n t   t a r g e t s ,   s u c h   a s   m a x i m i z i n g   t h e   p r o f i t ,   i n c o m e ,   e m p l o y e e ’ s   i n c o m e   o r  
with management of license, etc. In order to compare with the literature, we assume that public firm will
maximize social welfare, see De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Katsoulacos (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and
White (1998).3
is given exogenously and values in the interval (0, 1). Following Matsumura (1998), the
government can indirectly control  through its shareholding. The fully private firm seeks
t h e   f i r m ’ s   p r o f i t   i f 1   ; contrarily, a fully nationalized firm maximizes social welfare if
0   .
The government may choose an optimum tariff rate to maximize social welfare or tariff
revenue (R), which are denoted by:
  t Max. W
  t Max.
1
n
fi i R t q
  (4)
3. TariffAnalysis
A backward induction method is used to solve the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
In the 2
nd stage, we get the first-order derivatives from equations (1) and (3):
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The equilibrium quantities are obtained,
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From Eq. (8) we see that if      
θ








ˆ ,   f o r e i g n   f i r m ’ s   p r o d u c t i o n  
is zero which means tˆis a prohibitive tariff rate. We take the partial derivative of Eqs. (7)






































A higher tariff rate  w i l l   i n c r e a s e   d o m e s t i c   p r o d u c t i o n   a n d   d o m e s t i c   f i r m ’ s   profit. This is4
profit shifting effect called by Brander and Spencer (1984). As mentioned above,
go v e r n m e n t ’ s   g o a l   i s   t o   c h o o s e   a n   o p t i m u m   t for maximizing social welfare or tariff
revenue. In the 1
st stage, the domestic government maximizes social welfare or tariff
revenue. Solving the maximizing problem, Eq. (2) and (4) are differentiated with respect
to t, respectively,
 
fi fi s s
s s f
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(12)
Eq. (11) indicates the impact of tariff rate on domestic social welfare. It can be
decomposed into three effects: firstly, consumer-surplus effect is negative, increasing tariff
will decrease consumer surplus; secondly, profit-shifting effect  i s   p o s i t i v e ,   d o m e s t i c   f i r m ’ s  
profit is raised when tariff is increased. Higher tariff increases  f o r e i g n   f i r m ’ s   m a r g i n a l   c o s t  
which will make domestic firm more competitive, profit is shifted from foreign firm to
domestic firm; thirdly, tariff- revenue effect, it could be either positive or negative. As is
well known, the tariff revenue effect is zero when the government practices the
maximum-revenue tariff policy. Nevertheless, under optimum-welfare tariff policy, the
sign of Eq. (11) depends on the relative magnitudes of consumer surplus effect and
profit-shifting effect. For example, if consumer-surplus effect plus profit-shifting effect is
positive, and tariff-revenue effect is negative, then from Eq. (11), optimum-welfare tariff
rate is higher than that of maximum-revenue tariff.
Substituting Eqs. (7) and (8) into (2) and (4), we then take the first-order derivative
with respect to t, that gives the following optimum tariffs
4:
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dtR is monotone; that is, the
maximum-revenue tariff will be higher with a higher degree of privatization. For tariff
4 The second-order condition is always satisfied.5
revenue-maximizing government, it needs to import more to satisfy the domestic demand
when the privatized firm decreases output in response to higher degree of privatization, and
that will enlarge the tariff-revenue effect.
Eq. (13) is the equivalent expression of optimum-welfare tariff in Eq. (15) of Chao and
Yu’ s (2006) linear demand case. They argued that if the degree of privatization is higher,
then domestic country will import more, and the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher. To
see how privatization policy influences tariff decision-making, letting
            
  s f
s f s f s f s f
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dtw . When the government startup
privatization, profit-inclined privatized firm will reduce its output, deteriorated the
consumer-surplus effect, but enhanced both the profit-shifting effect and tariff-revenue
effect, and accordingly, the government will need to lower tariff rate for securing social
welfare. However, when the path of privatization accelerates,   ˆ  , privatized firm then
lost its market-dominating position, and the government will need to raise welfare-optimum
tariff rate for the purpose of protecting profit-inclined privatized firm.
Comparing these two tariff rates, we have
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W t t  .
Proposition 1: In an international mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs and partial
privatization, when the marginal cost of the privatized firm exceeds a critical value,
maximum-revenue tariff is higher than optimum-welfare tariff. Otherwise,
optimum-welfare tariff is higher than maximum-revenue tariff.
Differentiating s c ~ with respect to n and  , we have
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From Eq. (16) , a negative relationship between s c and n indicates that in a mixed
oligopoly with partial privatization, the critical level of marginal cost makes the sum of
consumer surplus effect and profit-shifting effect be positive but gradually decrease along
with an increasing number of foreign private firms. That is to say, it is highly possible that
the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff when the number
of foreign firms increases, ceteris paribus. Accordingly, the possibility that the
optimum-welfare tariff is greater than the optimum-revenue tariff may decline. Associating
with the market-opening policy, the domestic government should accelerate privatization
path and impose a lower welfare-optimum tariff rate.
4. Conclusion
Collie (1991) argued that when the marginal cost of domestic firm is higher than that
of foreign firm under a pure Cournot duopoly market, the maximum-revenue tariff may be
higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. This paper re-examined this important tariff ranking
issue in mixed oligopoly with partial privatization and extended the optimal tariff finding of
Chao-Yu (2006) and Van Long and Stähler (2009) in linear mixed oligopoly.
Two major findings of this paper are that: firstly, in a mixed oligopoly with partial
privatization and asymmetric marginal costs, when the marginal cost of privatized firm is
higher than a critical value, the optimum-welfare tariff will be higher than the
maximum-revenue tariff; secondly, when the number of foreign firms increases, it is highly
possible that the optimum-welfare tariff will be lower than the maximum-revenue tariff,
ceteris paribus.
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